The human factors insights of how they are incorporated into the vehicle are crucial towards designing and planning the internal designs necessary for future spacecraft and missions. The adjusted mission concept of supporting the Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission will drive some human factors changes on how the Orion will be used and will be reassessed so as to best contribute to missions success. Recognizing what the human factors and health functional needs are early in the design process and how to integrate them will improve this and future generations of space vehicles to achieve mission success and continue to minimize risks.
The human factors insights of how they are incorporated into the vehicle are crucial towards designing and planning the internal designs necessary for future spacecraft and missions. The adjusted mission concept of supporting the Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission will drive some human factors changes on how the Orion will be used and will be reassessed so as to best contribute to missions success. Recognizing what the human factors and health functional needs are early in the design process and how to integrate them will improve this and future generations of space vehicles to achieve mission success and continue to minimize risks. 
I. Introduction
AKING into account the human element and protecting for human health is critical towards having a successful mission. Many elements of the mission contribute towards the necessary habitable volume design and planning. The Asteroid Redirect Mission merges the Orion Program's capabilities with the Orion vehicle with the newly proposed Asteriod Redirect Vehicle (ARV) to capture and retrieve an asteroid, move to a deep retrograde orbit (DRO) around the moon, and then send a crew out to procure a sample to return to earth for sample analysis.
The Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission is expected to leverage off the Orion spacecraft accommodations to meet the new mission design parameters. Orion has been designed to enable crew transportation missions of less than one month in duration. All of the daily habitability functions must be accommodated within the spacecraft. These functions i crew exer maintenanc in volume and kits n accommod These i and missio human fac success. R to integrate to minimiz biomechan functions a for the gro The Or vehicle for integration 
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The c throughout without bl the crew sl manner so loud noise darkness in bags which in an app sufficient s communication dropouts due to a combination of mission attitude requirements and blockage caused by the ARV solar arrays with the asteroid, so the crew will need to be sufficiently independent so as not to require communication during those periods. Between EVAs, the crew will need to service and checkout the equipment including recharging the suit and tool batteries, cleaning the suit interiors, replacing biomed sensors, and checking out Exploration PLSS components. Also, depending on the structural and GN&C assessment, exercise may be suspended during this docked period so as not to cause any vehicle structural damage or undue thruster firings to maintain attitude.
C. Meal v
After the five days, the vehicle will undock from the ARV, and during the 12 days of return transit, the crew will stow the EVA equipment and samples and prepare for return. Again, if there is any crew assist needed for the vehicle command and controls during undocking and the Lunar Gravity Assist maneuvers, the crew will prepare and implement the operational steps to support the acitivities. Upon approach to reentry to Earth, the crew will stow any remaining items, don their protective MACES suits, and return similarly to the EM-2 mission. (See Table 2) A comparison of the two different timelines will show that there are fundamental differences in how the Orion vehicle will be used for the different missions. Some aspectssuch as a smaller crew of two -may make internal operational plans easier, while others -such as suiting up and using the Orion capsule as an airlock -are likely to add additional complexity to planned mission operations.
V. Human Factors Design Technical Challenges

A. General Design
Engineering the vehicle design to incorporate the crewed volume while minimizing mass and volume impacts is not an easy task. Multiple systems have to be planned for and integrated to provide the needed access and control points when needed while minimizing the piping, cabling and other structural adaptations needed so as to reduce routing and improve access to the needed operational locations. For example, the umbilical routing for air delivery to the MACES suits are being assessed for the most efficient routing. Current plans would require about 44 ft. configured to reach each crew around the seats and to avoid snagging.
In 2013 some human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing with a mockup of the Orion vehicle was conducted to evaluate the impact of changes to the seat attachment and attenuation system especially in the areas of crew egress and habitability. The teams assessed impacts to major systems such as WMS access, volume, and obstructions, stowage locker accessibility, radiation shelter entry/exit, exercise locations, and post-landing ready-access water locations. These assessments helped to inform emergency equipment re-locations and whether proposed internal configuration changes were viable.
The updated EM-2 mission and the supporting validation activities will continue to inform and identify other potential adjustments needed to accommodate the mission concept changes for the vehicle from the original concept.
B. Stowage
All of the flight crew equipment must be safely stowed or restrained for launch, launch aborts, and entry. This equipment includes everything the crew needs that the vehicle does not otherwise provide, such as food, change of clothes, laptop, or solid waste containers. All these items must be volumetrically accommodated within the spacecraft. Because of Orion's small size, the available stowage volumes are irregularly shaped. The items to be Entry, crew recovery stowed within Orion are also non-uniform in shape. This creates organizational challenges to find a logical allocation of equipment to the available Orion stowage volumes. One important consideration is accessibility. When crew members need to access a particular item, it is helpful to minimize the amount of other stowed items that must be moved in order to gain access to the item in question. This is particularly important with respect to management of small items. One driving design consideration is the crew access of equipment after splashdown. The crew will be physiologically deconditioned after several weeks in microgravity and the spacecraft will be floating on the ocean, thus subject to disorienting and disruptive wave motion. The crew may need to access emergency equipment under these conditions. They should not need to unstow unnecessary items to access post-landing equipment nor should they need to assume difficult postures to do so.
Separation of food and waste is another design driver for stowage. Orion begins the mission with a large quantity of stowed food and no human waste. By the end of the mission the food volume has been largely consumed and there is a large quantity of human waste and trash, but it is unpalatable to stow the human waste where the food is stowed, leading to a driver for management of both food and waste stowage volumes.
The ARC mission requires mission-unique items to be stowed either within the standard cabin stowage volumes beneath the seats or on cabin mounts. These items include equipment to support the EVAs and the sample return container. A feasibility study was conducted to assess whether the ARC mission equipment would fit within the remaining volume left after accommodating the typical Orion flight crew equipment for this crew size and mission duration. Volumes of both sets of items were increased by 30% to account for packing inefficiencies (typically 20%) and an additional uncertainty of 10%. The total adjusted volume of all stowed items for the ARM were within the total stowed volume the vehicle can accommodate. As the ARM planning matures, it will build off of the EM-2 stowage work to examine which bays the ARM equipment would fit within while meeting the other design considerations previously described.
C. Exercise
Exercise in general can be difficult to include in vehicle design. In order to understand how best to integrate exercise activities, it helps to understand the reason exercise is needed during spaceflight. Throughout the first four to six weeks the human body goes through an acute adaptation period to the microgravity environment that affects many physiological systems. (See Table  3) For example, muscular strength decreases rapidly during this adaptation period.
(See Fig.  12 ) The decrease in muscular strength could keep the crew from successfully getting to safety in an off-nominal Orion landing event or having sufficient endurance to conduct successful EVAs. The International Space Station crew actively exercises 1.5 hours six days of every week to recover from the effects of spaceflight. Operationally Orion could support up to an hour per crew per day for four crew, however the protocol objectives are to complete the required exercise needed in 30 minutes per crew per day. Exercise is primarily used to counteract the muscle and aerobic losses experienced in the on-orbit environment; however, exercise requires a relatively large operational volume within the vehicle. Of the many vehicle design integration aspects required to incorporate exercise, some of the most difficult to accommodate can be identifying the space required to allow for crew movement with the equipment and designing atmospheric systems that can process the higher CO2, heat, and humidity created during exercise.
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F. Contingency Challenges
While some aspects of contingency planning seem obvious -such as positioning equipment where it can be conveniently accessed, other concerns are not as obvious. One of the challenges in a small space vehicle is protecting the crew from radiation events. Should an event be detected in time, the plan is for the crew to shift equipment and take shelter in the central stowage compartments under the front two seats. The removed stowed items would be placed around them to add additional protection until the event subsides.
Cabin design and planning for this event includes assessing air flow into the stowage compartments to prevent localized CO 2 buildup.
Protecting for medical events not only includes effective planning on what is being flown, but also planning for the operational space needed to provide access and care to an ill or injured crewmember. The amount of medical capability is based on a combination of duration of the mission, complexity of the mission and access to additional care. Orion nominal operational plans require a Level III level of care (See Table 4 ).
The ARCM mission introduction of EVAs also introduces additional medical contingency planning. Medical is a perhaps understated impact of adding EVAs. EVAs can create physical trauma that can require minor medical treatment. Specific injuries related to EVAs can include decompression sickness, shoulder injuries, fingernail trauma, and other hand injuries. These injuries are not likely to occur during IVA activity and therefore may not be addressed by the Orion medical outfitting planned for EM-2. Orion's planned medical kit contains medicine, first- aid supplies, and basic life support equipment for minor medical situations not requiring extensive treatment. EVArelated injuries cannot be mitigated through crew selection and may require the appropriate hardware to be added to the medical kit or adoption of a risk posture to not treat injuries incurred as the result of nominal EVA operations. Upon an off-nominal landing event that would cause issues such as problems with maintaining the Command Module's floatation or providing a toxic interior cabin environment, the crew would need to rapidly egress the vehicle. Vehicle design planning to protect for this capability requires that the activities such as configuring the crew's survival gear, deploying the life raft, and egressing the side (or top) hatch also needs to take into account the aerobically and muscularly deconditioned crew that may be experiencing orthostatic intolerance effects. Exercise is meant to help mitigate the aerobic and muscular deconditioning, while other mitigations are being investigated to mitigate the other orthostatic intolerance effects. Mobility aids are being assessed (See Fig. 15 ) to help crew exit their seats.
G. Sleep Locations and Meal Planning
Although several approaches are being reviewed, there are no defined locations for crew sleep or meal planning. For crew sleep it is assumed that crew members will strap crew restraints to random surfaces of the cabin. Limited CAD modeling demonstrated that it is possible to position four crew members in sleep-like postures. However, many factors that have not yet been modeled will drive which sleep positions are actually viable, such as internal temperature variations, humidity, noise, and lighting.
Given the small size of the vehicle volume, there is no constraint to maintain meal consumption within a specific distance of meal preparation equipment. Consequently, cabin configuration for meals will be a matter of crew preference. The primary constraint will be mitigation of task interference between crew member(s) responsible for meal preparation. This will likely mean that any meal preparation or clean up is done in an area that is not used for access to vehicle displays and controls, nor the WMS, nor exercise. This suggests either the aft bulkhead, or the ceiling above the WMS, or potentially a corner outboard of the display and control panel. Crew dining locations will probably vary from crew to crew, and possibly from meal to meal, but when all four crew eat as a group the center of the cabin volume will likely be a popular volume. When individual crew members eat alone, they will probably find the most comfortable, "out of the way" corner to occupy.
H. Trash
The plan for trash management is also still in developmental stages. Crew waste is expected to use the same WMS cans with charcoal odor filters that were used successfully on Shuttle. Food disposal plans are still in work to identify effective storage solutions that can contain both the trash and the odors effectively as Orion does not have the constant ventilation system that kept odors down in Shuttle. Stowage teams will also need to identify how to manage trash location so that food is kept apart from waste and other trash items. The trace contaminant control system may be able to help remove odors from the compartment, but will not limit the odors at the sources of the concerns -nor is the level of performance capability well understood just yet.
VI. Adjusting to New Mission Paradigms
There are particular philosophies that consciously or subconsciously guide the assumptions and decisions that are made by engineers within any given industry. Within the space industry there are a number of paradigms that have formed as the result of more than fifty years of human spaceflight. However, these paradigms are shaped by particular experiences that are not valid in all spaceflight architectures. The majority of human spaceflight experience is within Low Earth Orbit, which has given rise to paradigms that may be harmful in missions taking place beyond this regime. In flight maintenance philosophies have been heavily driven by our LEO experience. The Space Shuttle program employed a philosophy known as Redundancy Management (RM), where the Orbiter spacecraft employed functional redundancy in all critical systems, such that if any given component failed there was a backup component ready to take over its function. Flight rules were established to determine how long the vehicle could rely on backups and once a particular threshold was crossed, the crew was required to immediately prepare the vehicle for deorbit and conduct a mission abort. Multiple runways were on standby around the world, such that the crew could return home at any time. Once on the ground, the Orbiter would be repaired and placed back in the launch preparation flow.
The International Space Station cannot land, so unlike the shuttle it employed an Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) philosophy. In this case, should any component fail, either the function would be suspended or a backup would take over. Meanwhile, a replacement would be scheduled for installation -whether the replacement unit was already on the station or it needed to be launched on an upcoming logistics resupply flight. In the event of a failure that left the station uninhabitable, it could always be abandoned with the crew taking a docked spacecraft to land on Earth.
Both RM and ORU philosophies break down beyond LEO. At a DRO, trajectories are constrained both by distance and orbital phasing. There are specific windows where spacecraft can transit back to Earth. Unlike the shuttle, an Orion at a DRO is days away from an Earth return and cannot operate with nonfunctional critical system during a return cruise. Also unlike the ISS, the Orion will not receive regular logistics resupply flights. Thus, a new maintenance philosophy is needed that will be appropriate to Orion missions in DRO.
A similar challenge is faced in the area of crew health. Both ISS and Shuttle enjoyed the luxury of their proximity to the surface of the Earth. Hospital-quality medical care was never more than 72 hours away for an orbiting space crew. At DRO such medical care is as much as one to two weeks away from the point of declaration of an emergency. This implies the need to develop a new paradigm for the maintenance of crew medical care.
What is the philosophy on trash? Shuttle missions were typically 14 days or fewer and trash was stored in specialized compartments, some of which used vacuum venting as a method of odor control. ISS stores trash in logistics modules which periodically undock from the station and are disposed of by burning them up in the atmosphere. Orion cannot offload trash to other modules and the capsule does not have any form of vacuum venting or other odor control methods.
Finally, the confinement experienced by Orion crews is unlike prior human spaceflight experience. Both Skylab and ISS missions have exceeded ARM missions in duration, but with considerably greater habitable volumes and much more diverse crew tasks. The physiological and psychological challenges of the much smaller Orion capsule presents unknown challenges. Apollo crews (and some shuttle crews depending on internal outfitting) experienced similar volumes as Orion, but for much shorter missions. New paradigms in this arena may impact not only crew selection but also crew timelines.
VII. Operational Validation
In order to validate the operational plans and identify additional technical challenges, human factors and human systems engineering assessments have peen performed simulating key mission tasks such as crew ingress, emergency egress and various systems configurations. As these assessments are done, critical performance factors are identified that occasionally lead to internal systems modifications. For example, under the new mission concept, the crew will use the Orion vehicle as an airlock, so room must be available and equipment configured so as not to damage the MACES EVA suits upon egress and entry for all the crew. As those same suits are the safe haven for a cabin depressurization event, the suits must also be designed for rapid donning by all crew before the Orion ECLSS system loses the ability to maintain cabin pressure.
Several methodologies exist that can inform design planning and validate that intended performance criteria were met. Historical data from similar spaceflight programs can qualitatively help in assessing planned numbers in a vehicle design -if both the historical data and design data are well understood for their similarities and differences. This historical data is often incorporated for use in parametric assessments which can be used to qualitatively rate the planned estimates. A "bottoms-up" assessment may be used once enough fidelity in the planned implementation is defined wherein known capabilities are defined and understood to the individual items and specific implementation details and then integrated up through the various subsystems to provide a vehicle level integration picture. Example analog missions may be used to validate design planning and performance once subsystem components are available for assessment or when operations are sufficiently defined. Analog mission activities can drive consideration of crew timelines and activities in ways that can be otherwise overlooked during design studies. They can also reveal critical architectural gaps before vehicle maturity has progressed to the point where corrective measures can become prohibitively expensive. For instance, there may be conflicts between crew exercise, mission science, WMS usage, and spacecraft operations that may not show up during standalone humanin-the-loop evaluations of the cabin. However, during a multi-day analog mission evaluation the crew is responsible for completing a specific set of science objectives while responding to spacecraft operation tasks, conducting daily exercise, using the WMS, eating, sleeping, and conducting other habitation tasks. In such a scenario it becomes readily apparent when vehicle configuration (volumes, layouts, orientations, and co-locations) negatively impacts crew productivity or safety. Vehicle mock-ups depending on fidelity to planned equipment may provide a 1G insight into operational space, organization, accessibility, and other vehicle system aspects that may be difficult to assess in models.
However models play a critical function in vehicle design and planning. A recent assessment incorporating higher fidelity equipment models into the vehicle model identified additional habitation volume was needed for there are generally fewer options available and those tend to be more expensive and less capable than what could have been accommodated earlier.
Flying to trans-lunar space carries with it the standard crewed vehicle challenges of designing for appropriate space for the transiting crew, but also introduces additional risks due to the inability to easily return to Earth in contingency situations. The addition of the asteroid mission introduces additional complexities and operational challenges for the crew due to the planned EVAs, sample collections, and longer mission.
The Orion is intentionally a small spacecraft compared to the Space Shuttle, which places some limitations on the capabilities of the vehicle to provide the human factors and human health capabilities to support its crew. Other limitations have been built into the vehicle as a result of the design reference missions used to baseline spacecraft requirements. These limitations correspondingly scope how the vehicle may be used in both current and future operational paradigms. In some missions, Orion will function as an independent spacecraft, operating as the sole pressurized volume for a human space mission. However, in other missions it will be necessary to supplement Orion with additional pressurized volumes, whether in the form of logistics modules, space habitats, functionspecific modules, or other volumes as dictated by the desired resulting mission capability. Adjustments to the changing mission concepts will continue to be assessed and evaluated against the vehicle performance capabilities.
Understanding how the human interface and interaction considerations drive the vehicle design and operations will not only improve the vehicle but also protect needed capabilities for subsequent missions.
